

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20591



February 12, 1976

Mrs. Judy Hope
Associate Director, Domestic Council
Old Executive Office Bldg., Room 234
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mrs. Hope:

As you requested during the February 11 meeting in your office, I am enclosing a copy of the full report of the joint government-industry task force established under the chairmanship of Dr. McLucas immediately after the La Guardia explosion. Also, enclosed are copies of Dr. McLucas' January 9 transmittal of the report to Secretary Coleman and the Secretary's transmittal of January 12 to the President.

Distribution of the task force report and related information is restricted to those persons and organizations having a legitimate interest or need. To officially safeguard this information, the Administrator on January 9 issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation 31, a copy of which is also enclosed.

Thank you for your interest in civil aviation security and for your offer of assistance in carrying out President Ford's mandate for continued efforts to develop and implement comprehensive improvements in air transportation security. We look forward to seeing you at the next task force meeting 2:30 p.m., February 26, in the Administrator's conference room (room 1010) of the FAA Headquarters building.

Sincerely,

Richard F. Lally

RICHARD F. LALLY
Director, Civil Aviation Security Service

Enclosures

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 26, 1976


Dear Mr. Secretary:

You and your staff, as well as others from within the Government and from the airline industry, are to be commended for your diligent work in responding to the recent LaGuardia Airport tragedy.

Your assessment of the issues we face in seeking permanent solutions to the problems of air transportation security correctly identifies the need to evaluate specific actions in terms of their legal, economic and operational impact. To this end, I am pleased to learn of your plans to continue the close cooperation with responsible local officials, other Federal agencies and industry representatives. A particular effort should be made to coordinate your future activities with other agencies concerned with the broader question of security against these types of incidents.

Safe and timely air transportation is an essential element of our Nation's economic vitality, national security and general well-being. We must, therefore, protect airline passengers and our airline system from such acts of violence and destruction. The achievement of this goal will require the cooperation of officials at all levels of Government, of the transportation industry and of the general public. I urge all parties involved to cooperate in this effort and request your continued efforts to develop and implement comprehensive improvements in air transportation security.

Sincerely,



The Honorable William T. Coleman
Secretary of Transportation
400 7th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

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THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

January 12, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing herewith as Attachment B the initial report of the Task Force on Airport Security formed as a consequence of the bombing at LaGuardia Airport in New York City.

This Task Force, under the chairmanship of the Federal Aviation Administrator, Dr. John L. McLucas, responded quickly. I believe the enclosed report is an excellent example of what government and industry cooperation can do when faced with a serious problem of national consequence.

As a result of their efforts, the FAA is able to take positive actions which are outlined in their letter of transmittal (Attachment A). I have studied this report and agree with its recommendations. Dr. McLucas will make these actions public later this week.

In summary the immediate action which will be taken includes:

- (1) Immediate on-site surveys of the nation's air carrier airports under the leadership of FAA Explosives Security Specialists to identify measures that airport operators can introduce quickly to prevent or deter the introduction of explosives or to reduce the effects of explosions, and to develop longer range airport counter-measures.
- (2) Continue the repositioning of airport public lockers in secure areas or to take other steps to control access, increase effective surveillance or reduce the effect of explosions.
- (3) Develop with the air carriers an effective and efficient system to reduce the possibility of explosives being placed aboard planes in checked baggage.
- (4) Develop procedures which will permit a better detection of explosives in bags.

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In addition to the actions to be taken immediately, I am considering certain legislative initiatives which would improve the security situation at our nation's airports. I will submit them to you as they are developed.

I am also concerned that this problem of airport security extends to the other transportation modes. To answer this concern, I have directed action within my own office to make recommendations to increase security at all transportation terminals.

I very much appreciate your active concern and leadership in this process. I assure you that this Department will pursue a vigorous program of close cooperation with other concerned Federal and local agencies to insure the maximum practicable protection of passengers of this nation's transportation system. I will continue to advise you of further developments.

Respectfully,

/S/

William T. Coleman, Jr.

Attachments

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590



OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

January 9, 1976

Honorable William T. Coleman, Jr.
Secretary of Transportation
Washington, D. C. 20590

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In accordance with your instructions, I brought together experts from government and industry to review aviation security in light of the tragic explosion at LaGuardia Airport on December 29, 1975.

We do not now know whether the LaGuardia explosion was targeted against aviation or merely happened to occur in one of the lockers which are common to transportation terminals and other facilities serving the public. Whatever the connection, any strengthened security alternatives must be considered within the context of the U.S. air transportation system. There are 32 scheduled airlines operating a jet fleet of some 2,500 aircraft enplaning 500,000 passengers and more than 1,000,000 pieces of baggage on some 15,000 flights each day. The airlines serve almost 500 United States airports each of which is different in many respects. Accordingly, security alternatives must weigh carefully the impact on efficient movement of passengers, baggage and cargo, especially whether passengers can or should be expected to arrive at airports hours in advance of flight departures, and whether U.S. airports can or should be converted into fortress-like transportation facilities.

Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, the comprehensive working papers and studies should be carefully controlled. In the interests of aviation safety, I have accordingly determined that the detailed documentation not be circulated outside of authorized channels.

Based on the enclosed report, I am moving ahead on the following major initiatives:

Lockers: The LaGuardia explosion focused immediate attention on the security of public lockers. However, there are only 14,000 public-use lockers at airports and only 140 of the 500 air carrier airports in the country have any at all. And, the majority of these lockers are located at the 20 major airport terminals. So, securing

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lockers is not the only answer. However, we are recommending that, where feasible, lockers be located within secure areas. Where this is not feasible, other means should be taken to control access, increase effective surveillance or reduce the effects of explosions.

FAA is conducting an immediate on-the-spot survey of the nation's airports to identify measures that can be introduced quickly and gather data to help develop long-range countermeasures.

Increased attention will be directed toward the redesign of lockers, locker areas and terminals. New designs might include modifications, for example, that would permit visual detection of stored baggage or restructuring the locker to direct the explosion blast away from persons nearby. Tests of current and modified lockers will provide guidelines on the best courses to pursue.

Checked Baggage and Cargo: Although the LaGuardia explosion occurred in a locker, it drew attention to other aspects of airport security, including current security requirements for checked baggage. Strengthened measures range from examining each piece of baggage to the development of less time-consuming but effective methods to determine quickly baggage and cargo that require special security attention. We also reviewed stricter application of or modifications to the procedures for handling baggage by authorized airline personnel, and more stringent measures for safeguarding luggage once it has been accepted. Some of these procedures will go into effect immediately; others are being refined and will be selected for implementation within 30 days.

Explosives Detection Techniques: FAA will immediately begin modifying existing x-ray absorption systems for operation at selected airports to detect explosives. The FAA also will step up efforts already underway to determine the feasibility of:

1. Using the x-ray fluorescence concept as an explosive detection technique.
2. Using nuclear magnetic resonance to detect different types of explosives.
3. Applying explosive vapor detection techniques to the inspection of hold baggage, cargo and the aircraft itself. Technology has not yet been able to come up with a mechanical "sniffer" that can compete with the nose of a trained dog, and therefore, we intend to increase the use of explosive detection dogs.
4. Adapting a thermal neutron detection concept to examine checked baggage and cargo.

There are several criteria that must be used in the development of new equipment and procedures. They must be quick and effective. They must be reliable, easily maintained and operable by relatively unskilled personnel. They must not present any hazards to persons or the environment nor damage luggage or its contents. And airports, airlines and passengers must be able to afford them.


Based upon our final assessments, we may be asking for your assistance in obtaining additional funds required to carry out the expanded activities I have outlined if further funding appears necessary. We will, of course, explore the activities of other Federal agencies as they may relate to these initiatives to assure full utilization of appropriate Federal capabilities and to avoid any duplication of effort.

Ultimately, better methods and machines are not the entire answer, particularly if they induce a sense of complacency or relaxation of vigilance. When the FAA released its latest report on the number of hijackings and other criminal acts against aviation, some felt that the strict procedures introduced a few years back were no longer needed. But, the fact is that the threat is with us and our major concern is that people will not recognize this because of the program's success. So, too, with bombings. We must develop the best equipment and measures. But we all must realize that continued vigilance is equally vital.

After the LaGuardia bombing, I visited the LaGuardia, Dulles and National Airports to check their security devices and procedures, and I spoke to many airport and airline personnel. There is obviously a heightened level of awareness to the threat which is perhaps our most important immediate defense. All these people, from the sky-cap or the ticket agent who may first greet the travelers to the captain who flies them to their destination are the human factors on whom safety depends. Any technological help we give them to do their job is a plus, not the solution itself.

I am confident, in summary, that just as the anti-hijacking program has been extremely effective, we can be equally effective in preventing and deterring other criminal acts against aviation.

Sincerely,


John L. McLucas
Administrator

Enclosure

1-14-76

Title 14 - Aeronautics and Space

CHAPTER I - FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Docket No. 15290; Special Federal Aviation
Regulation No. 31]

Subchapter K - Administrative Regulations

RELEASE OF SECURITY INFORMATION

The Federal Aviation Administrator has been designated as chairman of an advisory committee on airport security and has been requested to provide a report dealing with possible countermeasures to the threat of explosive devices placed in airports in the United States. The purpose of this Special Federal Aviation Regulation is to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of information in, or obtained in connection with, his report or reports or records of the Advisory Committee on Airport Security established by the Secretary of Transportation.

Section 202 of the Transportation Security Act of 1974 added section 316(d) to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Section 316(d)(1) provides that the Administrator shall conduct such research (including behavioral research) and development as he may deem appropriate to develop, modify, test, and evaluate systems, procedures, facilities, and devices to protect persons and property aboard aircraft in air transportation or intrastate air transportation against acts of criminal violence and aircraft piracy. Section 316(d)(2) provides that, notwithstanding Section 552 of Title 5, United States Code, relating to freedom of information, the Administrator shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem necessary to prohibit

disclosure of any information obtained or developed in the conduct of research and development activities under section 316(d)(2) if, in the opinion of the Administrator, the disclosure of such information -

(A) would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy (including, but not limited to, information contained in any personnel, medical, or similar file);

(B) would reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential commercial or financial information obtained from any person; or

(C) would be detrimental to the safety of persons traveling in air transportation.


The Administrator has determined that the disclosure of information in, or obtained in connection with, his report or reports or records of the advisory committee would be detrimental to the safety of persons traveling in air transportation and may also come within section 316(d)(2)(A) and (B). Therefore, the Administrator has found that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable and that good cause exists for making this special regulation effective immediately.

This special regulation is issued under the authority of section 316(d) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1357).

In consideration of the foregoing, the following Special Federal Aviation Regulation is adopted, effective January 9, 1976:

SPECIAL FEDERAL AVIATION
REGULATION NO. 31

Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no person may disclose any information in, or obtained in connection with, reports or records of the Advisory Committee on Airport Security established by the Secretary of Transportation or any related reports of the Administrator.



John McLucas
Administrator

Issued in Washington, D.C., on January 9, 1976